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Abstract: We developed a simulation game to study the effectiveness of decision-makers in 
overcoming two complexities in building cybersecurity capabilities: potential delays in capability 
development; and uncertainties in predicting cyber incidents. Analyzing 1,479 simulation runs, 
we compared the performances of a group of experienced professionals with those of an 
inexperienced control group. Experienced subjects did not understand the mechanisms of delays 
any better than inexperienced subjects; however, experienced subjects were better able to learn 
the need for proactive decision-making through an iterative process. Both groups exhibited 
similar errors when dealing with the uncertainty of cyber incidents. Our findings highlight the 
importance of training for decision-makers with a focus on systems thinking skills, and lay the 
groundwork for future research on uncovering mental biases about the complexities of 
cybersecurity. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Research motivation 
The aftermaths of recent major data breaches and cyberattacks—affecting organizations from 
Yahoo, Target, T-Mobile, Sony Pictures, and JP Morgan to the US Democratic National 
Committee—reveal how critical it is for organizations to remain vigilant and act effectively in 
protecting against cyber incidents. In December 2016, Yahoo announced that over one billion 
accounts had been compromised in a recent incident [1]. In May 2017, Target agreed to pay 
$18.5 million in settlements and the total cost of the company’s 2013 data breach reached $292 
million [2]. Beyond the financial impact [3], a cyberattack may, for example, cause irreparable 
damage to a firm in the form of corporate liability [4], a weakened competitive position, and loss 
of credibility [5].  
In coming years, the threat posed by cyberattacks will continue to grow as attacks become 
more sophisticated and organizations continue to implement innovative technologies that often—
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albeit inadvertently—introduce new, more subtle vulnerabilities. Research also suggests that 
attackers in cyberspace are not only rational and motivated by economic incentives [6], but also 
act strategically in identifying targets and approaches [7]—in other words, “The good guys are 
getting better, but the bad guys are getting badder faster” [8]. Perhaps there was a time a decade 
ago when cybersecurity was only a matter of “if” an organization was going to be compromised, 
but today it has become a question of “when,” and “at what level.”  
Despite the proliferation of cyberattack capabilities and their potential implications, many 
organizations still perform poorly with respect to cybersecurity management. These companies 
ignore or underestimate cyber risks, or rely solely on generic off-the-shelf cybersecurity 
solutions. A mere 19% of chief information security officers (CISOs) are confident that their 
companies can effectively address a cybersecurity incident [9]. In May 2017, the WannaCry 
ransomware attack—a type of malware that blocks access to computer systems until a ransom is 
paid—affected companies worldwide, even though a patch for the exploited Windows 
vulnerabilities had been made available by Microsoft months earlier in March 2017 [10]. As data 
grows in size and value, the increase of cyber risks and escalation of privacy concerns demand 
that managers improve their approach to cybersecurity capability development—interventions to 
build such capabilities typically include improvements to technology already in place, in addition 
to the purchase of new technology, talent acquisition, and training, among other activities. 
1.2. Research objective and approach  
The importance of being proactive in cybersecurity capability development is well understood—
it is more cost effective than taking a reactionary approach and reduces failure rates [11]. 
Although many executives and decision-makers are becoming aware of the significance of 
cybersecurity, a major question remains unanswered: Are experienced managers more proactive 
than inexperienced individuals in building cybersecurity capabilities? Further, can proactive 
decision-making be taught through an iterative learning process in a simulation environment? 
In an attempt to answer these questions, we developed a management simulation game and 
conducted an experiment with experienced professionals in cybersecurity from diverse industries 
and a group of inexperienced graduate students. In our game, players decide how to invest in 
building cybersecurity capabilities for an anonymous company and monitor the effects of their 
decisions over the course of five years in the game.  
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We used simulations to facilitate the analysis of learning effects. Simulations are widely used 
for research and educational purposes, especially when experimentation is not feasible. For 
example, pilots are required to have a certain number of hours logged in flight simulators before 
flying a jet. Likewise, managers should have appropriate training before assuming leadership 
positions in complex organizational environments [12]. Management flight simulators are 
interactive tools that provide a virtual environment similar to the actual work settings of 
managerial decision-makers. Unlike in the real world where a bad choice may result in the 
failure of a business, simulations allow managers to practice decision-making skills without fear 
of real consequences outside of the game. Also, using a simulator allows for many more “flights” 
than might be feasible or economical. 
Moreover, management flight simulators are potentially helpful for observing the long-term 
consequences of a decision or series of decisions. These simulators can also facilitate an iterative 
learning process—i.e., managers can implement their decisions, advance the simulation, monitor 
the effects of their decisions over time, reset the simulation, and iterate this process with another 
set of decisions. Similar applications have been developed in other fields, such as climate policy 
[13], strategic management [14, 15], and health policy [16, 17].  
In addition to providing a tool to conduct this study, our simulation game allowed the 
subjects to experience and learn from the complexities of allocating resources for building 
cybersecurity capabilities. The game focuses on how a manager’s decisions may impact his or 
her business, given the potential delays in building capabilities, and the unpredictability of 
cyberattacks.  
1.3. Research contributions 
Our study contributes to the current literature on cybersecurity in three ways: 1) It examines the 
effects of management experience in making proactive decisions for the development of 
cybersecurity capabilities, while accounting for uncertainties in cyber risks and delays in 
building capabilities; 2) It measures the effects of iterative learning on making proactive 
decisions through a simulation game tool; and 3) It applies a systems approach to improving 
cybersecurity using system dynamics modeling.  
First, researchers have studied cybersecurity investment strategies in general (e.g., see [18-
20]), in addition to the more specific question of trade-offs between proactive and reactive 
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investment strategies (e.g., [11]). However, individuals’ proactive and reactive investment 
decisions have received little attention—especially with regard to the uncertainties of cyber risks 
and misconceptions about, the lags in observing the benefits of capabilities. Our research aims to 
address this neglected area of study, but it should be noted that while there is a wide range of 
biases in individuals’ decision-making, we focus only on biases with regard to delays in building 
cybersecurity capabilities. Second, we measure the effects of iterative learning in a simulation 
environment [21, 22] on proactive decision-making in cybersecurity capability development. 
Finally, systems thinking in general and system dynamics modeling in particular are not new 
approaches in the area of information science and technology (e.g., see [23, 24]), yet they are 
rarely applied to cybersecurity—especially to the business and management aspects of 
cybersecurity. Our simulation game views the problem of investment from a systematic 
perspective. It includes feedback delays in both building capabilities and identifying the 
consequences of decisions. Its underlying development uses system dynamics simulation 
modeling.  
This paper is organized as follows: We first review the relevant literature and theoretical 
background information. Next, we present our research methodology, including the simulation 
game and the experimental setup, followed by the results, contributions to research and the 
literature, limitations and future research directions, and then our conclusions.  
2. Theoretical background 
Given that cybersecurity capability development is at the core of our simulation game, we first 
briefly review capability development. We then discuss the main theoretical framework of our 
simulation game that is based on the uncertainty of cyber incidents and delays in cybersecurity 
capability development.   
From a general organizational perspective, ‘capability’ is the ability of an organization to 
produce a particular output [25]. From a resource-based perspective, Bharadwaj [26] developed 
the concept of IT as an organizational capability. Here, we consider cybersecurity capability as 
an organizational capability (similar to [27]) and focus on its development challenges within 
organizations—driven from managers’ perceptions and understanding of the complexities of 
capability development.  
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Strategic management and organizational science literature shows that differences in 
configurations of organizational resources and capabilities explain much of the heterogeneity in 
organizational performance [28-30]; however, achieving optimal configurations of resources and 
capabilities is a complex task in which not all organizations succeed [31-33]. Similarly, 
configuration of cybersecurity capabilities is inextricably tied to organizational performance, and 
evidence shows that major variations in the configuration of cybersecurity resources exist from 
company to company [34].  
As an example, consider two similar organizations: organization A and B. Organization A 
has already invested and allocated some of its resources to develop cybersecurity capabilities and 
as a result has well-defined plans for maintaining such capabilities. However, organization B 
does not have a similar perspective on cybersecurity and will only respond to cyber events in an 
unprepared, reactive mode. While these two different allocation of resources can explain 
differences in response speed and the effectiveness of responses in the wake of a cyberattack, the 
key question is what drives organization A, and not organization B, to allocate its resources to 
preemptive measures. In other words, what differences exist between managerial perspectives in 
resource allocation with respect to cybersecurity?  
Effective investments in IT [35, 36], and in information security in particular [20, 37-40], 
have long been topics of interest in both academic and industry circles. In general, by allocating 
resources to cybersecurity capabilities, managers can not only effectively reduce potential losses 
due to cyberattacks, but also improve overall performance of their operations [20]. However, it 
remains that the diversion of funds away from profit-making processes and assets reduces cash 
flow [41]—an issue that is exacerbated in small and medium-sized enterprises where there is 
often little or no additional funding available for cybersecurity [42]. Furthermore, unlike 
investors who can diversify their holdings according to their appetite for risk, managers often 
have limited tenure in their organizations and have little choice in dealing with the risk that their 
company faces. Managers have to make trade-offs with regard to how they invest their resources 
to defend their systems [42], and it turns out that incentives drive managers to protect 
organizational assets in the short-term at the expense of planning for the long-term [41]. In our 
simulation game, players deal with this trade-off when they make investment decisions for 
building cybersecurity capabilities.  
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While the growing bank of literature on cybersecurity discusses the above questions to a 
certain extent, the answers we seek to the challenges of building cybersecurity capabilities in 
organizations are rooted in misconceptions about two particular aspects of complexity that have 
received little attention: the uncertainty surrounding cyber incidents, and delays in building 
cybersecurity capabilities. We discuss these two aspects next.  
2.1. Uncertainty of cyber incidents 
In conventional decision-making theories, the trade-off between risk and expected return is 
resolved by calculating risks and choosing among risk-return combinations [43]. A rational 
decision-maker invests in information security if the investment yields a positive return, or if the 
cost of the investment is less than that of the risk it eliminates. With these decisions, it is critical 
to have information not only about the likelihood of security incidents, but also about the impact 
of information security risks; however, when it comes to allocating resources to information 
security, difficulties in measuring the costs and benefits of information security investments 
cloud the vision of the rational decision-maker [44]. In addition, a consensus is rarely found 
among stakeholders regarding such cost-benefit analyses [45]. In risk management, it is difficult 
to measure the hypothetical impact of an event that is avoided [46]. Similarly, in the case of 
cybersecurity investment, it is difficult to estimate the impact of a hypothetical cyber incident. 
Further complications include a lack of historical data and effective metrics related to 
cyberattacks [47], a lack of knowledge about the type and range of uncertainties, a high level of 
complexity, and poor ability to predict future events [48]. Consequently, managers often make 
decisions based on their experience, judgment, and their best knowledge concerning the 
likelihood of uncertain events, such as cyber incidents [47]. 
While a manager’s perception of risk is driven by his or her organizational and information 
system environment, as well as individual characteristics [49], research shows that humans in 
general do not have a strong intuition when it comes to low-probability, high-consequence 
scenarios, like cyberattacks. Intuitive assessment of probability is often based on perceptual 
quantities, such as distance, scale, or size [50]. Consider an example borrowed from behavioral 
economics: The more sharply one can see an object, the closer it appears [51], but if visibility is 
poor, people tend to underestimate the distance between themselves and the object.  
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The uncertain nature and severity of cyber threats, compounded with frequent shifts in 
technology acquisition and the introduction of new vulnerabilities makes it difficult for decision-
makers to allocate resources for investment in cybersecurity capabilities [52]. The growing 
presence of cyber threats has resulted in an environment that has produced a large stream of 
information that focuses on technical defenses, but neglects the economics of cybersecurity 
investment [53]. If a company does not experience any cyberattacks—more precisely, if it does 
not detect any cyberattacks—there is little motivation to invest in cybersecurity. For this reason, 
many managers often do not envision cyber risks properly, hence, it is not surprising to observe 
significant gaps between managers’ perceptions and the actual state of the cybersecurity of their 
organizations [54]. As a result, they may underestimate the frequency at which incidents could 
occur, and the time it takes for cybersecurity capabilities to become active in preventing, 
detecting, and responding to an incident. 
2.2. Complex systems and delays in building cybersecurity capabilities 
A complex system includes a web of interconnected components, among which there are 
potential delays. Regardless of the complexity of a system, a manager’s problem solving method 
is often reactionary and event-oriented [55]; however, the use of event-oriented decision-making 
frameworks (e.g., situation and goals → problem → decisions → results) leads to a failure to 
understand the connections among components and potential delays between cause and effect. 
Delays between applying a decision and its effect create instability, increase the tendency of a 
system to oscillate, and push managers to attempt to reduce this perceived time gap long after 
proper corrective actions have been taken to restore the system to equilibrium [55]. Hence, a lack 
of understanding of the delays inherent in a system can lead to ineffective decision-making.  
Even simple systems are not immune to this problem, as time delays and feedback loops 
between causes and effects can create complicated outcomes that are hard to anticipate [56]. 
Indeed, even highly educated and experienced individuals have been shown to perform poorly 
when making decisions in such conditions—see [57-62] for examples in various research 
settings. Despite these findings in other settings, practitioners in information security may 
believe that experienced managers understand the impact of delays better than inexperienced 
individuals, because of their extensive experience in industry. 
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Like other complex systems, cybersecurity systems include potential delays. For instance, the 
time it takes to develop and build cybersecurity capabilities is a major source of delays, often 
taking years. Human factors play a crucial role in cybersecurity [63], and recent analyses show 
that employees are often the weakest link in an organization with regard to cybersecurity [64]. 
As a result, organizations are urged to consider investing in cybersecurity training as a top 
priority [65], and to encourage protection-motivated behaviors [66, 67].  
These recommendations mean nothing if organizations fail to understand the impacts of 
delays and fall into the trap of short-termism (in line with the productivity paradox and the lags 
in deriving the benefits from IT investments [68, 69]). Considering the delays required for the 
adoption of, or transition to new technologies, and for providing necessary cybersecurity training 
to employees, organizations may not see a return from cybersecurity training for several years.  
In a reactive organization where managers start investing in the development of cybersecurity 
capabilities only after detecting an attack, the organization’s computer-based information 
systems will not properly recover in time and will remain vulnerable. While the delay between 
cybersecurity decisions and their ultimate effects seems simple in theory—with which 
experienced managers would be familiar—the possession of such necessary intuition among 
managers is far from adequate. 
In the next section, we discuss how our simulation game addresses the uncertainty of cyber 
incidents and delays in building cybersecurity capabilities.  
3. Methods 
3.1. Cybersecurity simulation game 
Here, we describe cybersecurity capabilities and then present the simulation game and the setup 
of the experiment.  
3.1.1. Cybersecurity capabilities at the core 
 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) cybersecurity framework [70] 
includes five capability categories: identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. For simplicity 
in the simulation game, we summarize these capabilities into three general categories: 
prevention, detection, and response/recovery capabilities. We merged ‘identify’ and ‘protect’ 
categories into prevention capabilities, and ‘respond’ and ‘recover’ categories into one group of 
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response/recovery capabilities. In the simulation game, prevention capabilities help block 
computer-based information systems from being compromised by cyberattacks. Detection 
capabilities help detect systems that are at risk of, or presently under attack. Response/recovery 
capabilities help fix vulnerabilities and mitigate the damage done by an attack.  
3.1.2. Simulation model in the game 
The game is developed based on a system dynamics simulation model. The model includes three 
main entities: computer-based information systems, cybersecurity capabilities, and cyber 
incidents. Computer-based information systems are divided into four groups (visualized in the 
“Eco-system of computerized systems” section in Figure 1): 1) “systems not at risk” (systems 
with no known vulnerabilities), 2) “systems at risk” (systems with an unpatched vulnerability), 
3) “affected systems” (an attacker has taken advantage of the vulnerability), and 4) “affected 
systems that are detected” (the attack has been discovered). While the categorization of 
computer-based information systems could be more detailed, we use the four general categories 
above for the simplicity of the game. We discuss them in more detail below. 
 
 
Figure 1: The general structure of the simulation model used in the game 
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Model structure and formulation 
Cybersecurity capabilities are divided into three groups: prevention, detection, and response 
capabilities. Figure 1 presents the general structure of the simulation model, with details to 
follow. 
Players decide what percentage of their resources to spend on cybersecurity and how to 
distribute those resources among the three capability categories—see “Decision parameters” in 
Figure 1. Following the basics of organizational capability development [71], each category of 
capabilities (𝐶) is affected by the inflow “Capability development”, 𝐼(𝑡). Hence, the speed of 
change of the capability is 
𝑑𝐶(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐼(𝑡), where 𝑡 is simulation time. Each capability builds 
according to the decision parameters set by players, i.e., how much of available resources are 
allocated to each capability. Similar formulations are used in other settings—see [71-73]. 
We assume that there are multiple computer-based information systems in an organization 
and that all systems are initially in the “Systems not at risk” (SNR) group. As inadequate security 
practices persist, they may be moved to “Systems at Risk”, SR. The speed at which this occurs is 
determined by the “Risk Promotion” rate. Prevention capabilities help protect computer-based 
information systems against cyberattacks and therefore decrease the flow of systems from not-at-
risk to at-risk. Risk promotion is calculated as 
𝑆𝑁𝑅(𝑡).𝐴𝑆𝑃(𝑡)
𝑏𝑃𝑅
, where ASP (adverse security 
practices) is calculated as 
1
𝐶𝑃(𝑡)+1
, with 𝐶𝑃 representing prevention capabilities, and 𝑏𝑃𝑅 
representing the average duration to promote risk. Detection capabilities help detect cyber threats 
and limit the size of SR so that systems can be moved back to SNR. The flow from SR to SNR is 
calculated as 
𝑆𝑅(𝑡).(1−
1
𝐶𝐷(𝑡)+𝐶𝑃(𝑡)+1
)
𝑏𝐷𝑆𝑅
, where 𝐶𝐷(𝑡) is detection capabilities at time 𝑡, and 𝑏𝐷𝑆𝑅 is the 
average duration to detect SR. 
Systems at risk are vulnerable and can be affected at the onset of a cyberattack. Once 
affected, a system is moved to “Affected systems”, AS. The rate of “Cyber incident occurrence”, 
CIO, is calculated as 𝐶𝐼𝑂(𝑡) = 𝑆𝑅(𝑡). 𝐶𝐼(𝑡), where 𝐶𝐼(𝑡) is an exogenous fraction representing 
cyber incidents over the course of the simulation, which we will discuss in this section. Affected 
systems remain in the organization until they are detected, which depends on the adoption of 
detection capabilities. Once detected, systems are moved to “Affected systems that are detected”, 
11 
 
ASD, at a rate of 
𝐴𝑆(𝑡).(1−
1
𝐶𝐷(𝑡)+1
)
𝑏𝐷𝐴𝑆
, where 𝑏𝐷𝐴𝑆 is the average duration to detect that a system is in 
AS. Eventually, if proper response and recovery capabilities are in place, a system in ASD can be 
recovered, and moved back to SNR. The rate at which this occurs is the patching rate, determined 
by 
𝐴𝑆𝐷(𝑡).(1−
1
𝐶𝑅𝑅(𝑡)+1
)
𝑏𝑅
, where 𝐶𝑅𝑅(𝑡) represents an organization’s response and recovery 
capabilities at time 𝑡, and 𝑏𝑅 is the average duration of the process of patching a system. 𝑏𝑃𝑅 and 
𝑏𝐷𝑆𝑅 are assumed to be six months and 𝑏𝐷𝐴𝑆 and 𝑏𝑅 are assumed to be two months. 
It is assumed that affected systems have the potential to decrease profits. We have selected 
profit as the main measure of performance in the game, because monetary gains and losses are 
tangible and intuitive to understand. In general, the impact of cybersecurity incidents are 
manifested in two forms: cash flow losses and reputation damage [74]. Ultimately, both forms 
are translated into dollar values and we consider profits as the relevant measure which could be 
positive or negative. While other performance outcomes could be considered in the game, we 
used profit as the only measure to facilitate teasing out the effects of players’ investment 
decisions. Also, given that organizational managers, particularly those sitting on boards or in 
executive roles, are typically focused on profits, it not only helps us simplify and communicate 
the goal of the game during experiments, but also helps players better monitor their performance 
and understand the effects of their decisions in the simulation.  
In practice, the decision to commit to cybersecurity investment results in immediate costs 
associated to adoption of new technologies, including usage, and learning and switching costs, 
among others [75]; however, the benefits of possessing cybersecurity capabilities are harder to 
see than its immediate costs. Resources spent on cybersecurity investments go towards 
mitigating the risk of cyber incidents, which may never occur [76]. Due to the nature of 
cybersecurity investment, it is difficult for managers to estimate the value of cybersecurity 
capabilities without readily available empirical evidence. 
We consider the trade-off between two major effects of allocating resources to building 
cybersecurity capabilities: 1) Reduced profits as building cybersecurity capabilities is an 
expense; 2) Possibility of protecting the organization from costly cyberattacks. Therefore, 
organizational resources, 𝑅, are either spent on making profits, 𝑅𝑃, or developing cybersecurity 
capabilities, 𝑅𝐶, where  
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𝑅 = 𝑅𝑃 + 𝑅𝐶. Hence, profits, 𝑃, are calculated as 𝑃 = 𝛼 ⋅ 𝑅𝑃 ⋅ (1 + 𝜉). The impact of affected 
systems on profit, 𝛼, is assumed to follow the non-linear functional form 𝛼 = 1 − (𝐴𝑆/𝑇)1/2, 
where 𝑇 is the total number of computer-based information systems in the organization. In our 
example, 𝑇 = 100. Profit is also subject to random shock 𝜉—this exogenous shock is a pink-
noise distributed normally according to 𝜉~𝑁(0. 𝜎𝜉
2) [77], assuming the correlation time to be 
three months, and 𝜎𝜉 = 0.1.  
As the players in the game can monitor profits over time and adjust their decisions 
accordingly, a feedback link is drawn from profits back to the decision parameters in Figure 1. 
The goal of the game is to maximize profits (specifically, accumulated profits over the course of 
a simulation run) by most efficiently allocating resources. Each simulation run covers 60 months. 
The trade-off between profits and protection poses a challenge, and adds to the complexity of the 
decision-making process already muddied by the uncertainties and delays discussed in Section 2. 
It is essential to note that in the game, investments in preventive capabilities alone are not 
sufficient to protect the organization. Players who only invest in prevention do not have 
detection and response capabilities, so they are not able to detect and recover from cyber 
incidents. While preventive capabilities reduce the risks that an organization will be affected by 
cyber incidents, they can never fully eliminate those risks. Only players who strategically invest 
early in all three categories of capabilities are successful in reasonably protecting their 
organizations against cyber incidents. They observe some early reductions in total profits due to 
extra costs of investments in cybersecurity, but they are also able to maintain high profits over 
the long term. 
In modeling complex systems, having a detailed and complicated model does not always 
translate to a more realistic simulation [78]. The simplicity of our model helps us better explain 
the behavior of players based on its dynamics. It also allows managers from different industry 
sectors to better engage with the model by relating it to their own organizations.  
Cyber incident patterns 
Five cyber incidents with different levels of impact occur in each simulation run (the higher the 
impact of the attack, the more influence on profit reduction). To keep the game simple, it is 
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assumed that all attacks are considered external attacks, in that they originate outside of the 
victim organization’s network, and are not categorized by type, such as a phishing attack or a 
network-traveling worm. While we acknowledge that the risk of an insider attack is significant in 
reality [79, 80], the simplifications we apply do not impact the relevance of our results, since 
most successful cyberattacks result in data loss or operational disruptions regardless of their 
nature. Figure 2-a shows a pattern of five cyber incidents (in Section 3.1.3, we will discuss how 
the pattern of the five attacks changes in the game), and Figure 2-b presents how the string of 
cyberattacks affects profits (compare blue and red lines).  
 
Figure 2: (a) One possible pattern of five attacks over the course of 60 months in the simulation, 
(b) Comparison of two simulations with (blue) and without (red) the impact of cyberattacks.  
The only difference between the two graphs in b is the occurrence of cyberattacks, and in neither 
simulation is any investment made in cybersecurity capability development, so any difference in 
profits is directly related to the cyberattacks shown in (a). 
3.1.3. How the game works 
The game runs online in an interactive environment where players have a decision parameter for 
each of the three types of capabilities: prevention, detection, and response. Players can adjust the 
value of the parameters representing the percentage of resources to allocate to each capability 
and when to allocate resources to each capability. Players implement their allocation strategy, 
(a) 
 
 
 
(b) 
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advance the simulation for 12 months, monitor changes in profit and have the option to modify 
their allocation strategy for the next year, and advance another 12 months until 60 months, five 
trials, have elapsed. Each decision parameter allows the player to invest 0% to 5%, an arbitrarily 
set range of the IT budget, in a specific cybersecurity capability. The profit graph and 
accumulated profits, in millions of dollars, are shown on the same screen and they are updated 
any time players advance the simulation. Figure 3 shows a screenshot of the online interface of 
the simulation game.  
 
Figure 3: Screenshot of the online simulation game 
 
Two levels of the game 
The game runs in two levels. In level one (deterministic), there are five cyberattacks with fixed 
impacts and at fixed times for all players. In level two (non-deterministic), five cyberattacks 
happen at random times with random impacts following a uniform probability distribution. All 
other factors remain the same between the two levels. In the interest of fairness for comparing 
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two levels, the total impact of the five random attacks in level two is controlled to be equal for all 
players, and is also equal to the total impact of the five fixed attacks in level one. 
Since differences in accumulated profit among players in level one can come only from 
differences in resource allocation, we expect that attentive players can learn how to maximize 
their profits after several runs; players can repeat simulations to learn about the optimal mix of 
investment parameters. In level two, on the other hand, unpredictability of attacks means that 
players face greater uncertainty when making decisions.  
3.2. Experimental setup 
We aimed to compare the performance of an experienced group to that of an inexperienced 
group in both a deterministic and non-deterministic setting. We discuss the setup of the 
experiment below. 
3.3.1 Subjects 
Players were divided into two groups: the experienced (experimental) group, and the 
inexperienced (control) group. The experiment group included participants at a cybersecurity 
conference in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and totaled 38 professionals, with an average of 15 
years of experience in IT and cybersecurity in a variety of industries. The control group included 
29 Master’s degree candidates enrolled in a general course about information technology. The 
experiment was conducted at the beginning of the semester so that any class materials would 
have minimal effect on the performance of the students, none of whom had had any prior 
experience in IT or cybersecurity. 
3.3.2 Experiment methods 
The two groups of players were tested separately. In each case, subjects played the simulation 
game in the same room at the same time. To avoid social influences [81], players were not 
allowed to talk to each other or reveal their results at any time during the game. They were given 
necessary background information prior to the start of the experiment in a short presentation 
about the three available capabilities and watched an example play-through. They were also told 
that the goal of the game was to maximize accumulated profit after a 5-year period and that the 
person with the highest profit would be awarded at the end of the game. It was made clear that no 
cybersecurity capabilities were already in place at the beginning of the game. Prior to playing the 
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game, players also had the opportunity to run the simulation themselves in a practice mode and 
could clarify any questions they had about the game.  
Subjects first played level one for ten minutes, then played level two for another ten minutes. 
During each ten-minute session, subjects could run the simulation as many times as they wanted. 
Players were not made aware of the difference between the two levels until the results of the 
experiment were presented at the end of the game.  
4. Results 
In each individual simulation run, we collected data of the three investment decision variables 
(prevention, detection, and response) as well as profit data over the duration of each run (60 
months). We also collected accumulated profits at the end of each full run to measure 
individuals’ performance. In the experiment and control groups, 14% and 10% of the runs were 
incomplete, respectively (i.e., the player left the simulation run before getting to the last month), 
and were thus excluded from the analysis. Table 1 presents the summary of the data included in 
our analysis. 
Table 1: Data summary 
Group 
Number of 
players 
Experience 
in IT or 
cybersecurity 
(years) 
 Number of 
individual runs 
 Median of the number of 
runs per player 
 
Level one Level two 
 
Level one Level two 
Experienced  38 15  431 361  9 8.5 
Inexperienced  29 0  342 345  12 12 
 
In the following sections, we first review two individual runs as examples of proactive and 
reactive runs. We then present a comparison between the results of the control group and the 
experiment group and highlight key findings.  
4.1. Proactive vs reactive 
Figure 4 shows a proactive run and Figure 5 shows a reactive run. The trade-off discussed in 
Section 3.1.2 can be seen in these two figures. When proactive players start investing in 
capability development they make noticeably less profit than the reactive players in the early 
stages of the game; however, once cyberattacks begin to occur, proactive players perform much 
better over the rest of the simulation.  
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Figure 4: An example of a proactive simulation run 
 
 
Figure 5: An example of a reactive simulation run  
4.2. Comparison of the group results 
Figure 6 shows the normalized distributions of subjects’ best performances for the two levels of 
the game. Both experienced and inexperienced groups displayed large variations in performance 
in levels one and two; however, this variation is almost twice as large in level two as it is in level 
one. Given that the pattern of the five cyberattacks is fixed in level one, there exists an optimal 
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set of values of the three decision parameters to maximize accumulated profits. Consequently, 
the distribution is skewed left for the poor performances, while some players are clustered close 
to a profit of M$2,500 on the right extreme of the distribution, indicating the maximum 
accumulated profit. In level two, the variability in performance increases since attacks occur 
randomly. Figure 6-b shows the distribution of performances in level two. It should be noted that 
the maximum accumulated profits in level two can be higher or lower than those of level one, 
due to the randomness of cyberattack occurrence.  
We analyzed whether experienced players performed better in level one than inexperienced 
players, because only proactive investment leads to better performance in level one. One might 
expect experienced players to perform better than inexperienced players; however, comparing 
the means of the distributions using the t-test reveals that no difference exists at the 5% 
significance level. In other words, players with managerial experience in cybersecurity do not 
operate more proactively than inexperienced players. 
Comparing the means of the distributions in level two (the level with random cyberattacks) 
using the t-test, we find that no statistically significant difference exists at the 5% significance 
level. Therefore, the experienced players do not make better decisions to develop cybersecurity 
capabilities than the inexperienced players.  
Given the interesting mixed results for experienced players’ performance in level one, we 
next analyzed the effect of iterative learning. 
 
 
Figure 6: Distributions of best individuals’ performances in level one (a) and level two (b) 
Experienced group  
Non-experienced 
(a) 
Level 1 
(b) 
Level 2 
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4.3. Effect of players’ iterative learning on their performance  
We use correlation analysis to study the effect of iterative learning (i.e., the effect of running a 
sequence of simulation runs on individuals’ performance). Figure 7 and Table 2 present the 
correlations between the number of simulation runs a player made in the 10 minutes of each level 
and the score of their best performances. Significantly positive correlations (p<0.05) are only 
observed for the experienced group in both levels (see Table 2). This result presents that the 
performance of experienced professionals significantly improved by conducting more simulation 
runs. As discussed earlier, high performances in the game can only be achieved by making 
proactive decisions; hence, the simulation game could pave the way for professionals to observe 
the effects of, and learn about, proactive decision-making.    
 
Figure 7: Relationships between the number of runs by an individual and that individual’s best 
performance (each circle presents the maximum profit achieved by an individual.) 
 
Table 2: Correlation between the number of runs and maximizing accumulated profits 
 Experienced  Inexperienced 
Level one  0.35*  0.39 
Level two  0.32*  0.34 
* p-value ≤ .05    
 
Inexp. group  
Level one 
Exp. group  
Level two 
Exp. group  
Level one 
Inexp. group  
Level two 
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Here we analyze the performance of players in each level of the game. Figure 8 and Figure 9 
show the variation of players’ performance (Y axis; accumulated profit) through the sequence of 
their runs (X axis; the number of runs for the respective player) in level one and level two, 
respectively.  
 
Figure 8: Learning curves of individuals in level one.  
For each group, plots are sorted based on their linear slopes (s). The Y-axis represents 
accumulated profits. The X-axis represents the run number for each respective user. User IDs are 
unique numbers for players.  
 
The graphs in Figure 8 and Figure 9 are sorted by linear slope in descending order, so that the 
graph in the top left-hand corner corresponds to the player who has shown the most improvement 
in accumulating profits over the course of his or her runs. For instance, in Figure 8, the top-left 
person in the experienced group (user 12) has the highest linear slope (s=152), which means the 
player improved his or her performance over the six runs in level one. 
Level one - plots are sorted based on line slopes (s) 
Experienced group  Inexperienced group 
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Considering the linear slope of a player’s performances allows us to observe all of their run 
data and observe their learning process. We only considered users who played at least five 
rounds in a level.  
 
Figure 9: Learning curves of individuals in level two.  
To interpret the results presented in Figure 8 and Figure 9, we sorted the users based on their 
linear slopes and analyzed how their ranks changed from level one to level two. Figure 10 
presents this analysis. The line connecting the user ID from level one to level two shows the 
change in ranking between the levels. A red line indicates a large decrease in ranking, while a 
green line indicates a large rise in ranking.  
Among the experienced group (the left side of Figure 10), the users who had the highest 
performance slope in level one performed among the worst in level two, while the users who 
performed poorly in level one were the better performers in level two. The top players in level 
one learned the game and were successful in tweaking their investment strategies to increase 
accumulated profits when confronted with the same fixed cyberattacks; however, the strategies 
Level two - plots are sorted based on line slopes(s) 
Experienced group  Inexperienced group 
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they had developed did not translate effectively to the random environment of level two, and 
some even performed more poorly than other players who had not performed as well in level 
one. This pattern is not observed in the inexperienced group (the right side of Figure 10) where 
the ranking of players seems to change more arbitrarily1. 
 
Figure 10: Mapping ranked users based on their learning slopes.  
A red line indicates a large decrease in ranking, while a green line indicates a large rise in 
ranking—lighter colors represent higher changes.  
 
                                                          
1 For instance, among the experienced group, the top six experienced individuals in level one had an average of 56% decrease in 
ranking in level two; however, among the inexperienced group, the top six individuals in level one had an average of 22% 
decrease in ranking in level two.  
Experienced group  Inexperienced group 
Level one                                                                   Level two  Level one                                                                    Level two 
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5. Discussion 
We first discuss our contribution to the literature, followed by our contribution to practice. We 
then discuss the limitations of our research and suggestions for future research. 
5.1. Contribution of research 
Our study contributes to research on three aspects of proactive decision-making in cybersecurity: 
the effects of feedback delays; the role of experience; and the search for optimum decisions. We 
first discuss these aspects and their potential causes, as explained by prior research. We then 
discuss the effects of learning on making better proactive decisions. 
First, our research confirms prior findings that in dynamic settings that are under uncertainty, 
decision-makers respond poorly to time delays (between control actions and their effects), and 
this strongly affects their decision performance [82-84]. If decision-makers do not compensate 
for feedback delays, they do not take a feedforward strategy and instead employ a feedback 
control strategy, which is only effective when there are no significant feedback delays [85]. In 
other words, they employ an open-loop approach that reduces the effectiveness of their decision 
performance [83, 86]. The feedforward strategy is the proactive approach needed to effectively 
build cybersecurity capabilities. We believe that it is reasonable to assume that problems in the 
performance of decision-makers are likely to be more exacerbated in the real world than the 
experimental setting, where they face a vastly more complex environment of cybersecurity with 
more feedback delays and uncertainties.  
Second, in our game experiment, experienced managers did not perform better than 
inexperienced individuals in making proactive decisions about building cybersecurity 
capabilities. This is in line with findings in the decision-making literature that, in general, more 
experience does not equal better decision-making [87-89]. The literature indicates that: 1) 
Experienced individuals employ less exhaustive search procedures, utilizing processes that have 
worked well in the past [90]; and 2) Managers leverage their cognition for decision-making [91, 
92], and their cognition could be biased by their experience [93].  
Third, experienced professionals who were successful in reaching the possible optimal 
investment in the first level of the game were not successful in achieving near optimality in the 
second level. A major factor in the poor performance of experienced managers in the game is the 
tendency of individuals to search for alternative optimum decisions. However, as our results 
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show, reaching optimality is hardly feasible due to the unpredictability of the times and impacts 
of cyber incidents. The decision-making literature suggests that there are two reasons for this 
poor performance: individuals’ reliance on satisfactory results; and their limitations in 
optimization searches. The decision-making process for individuals does not involve any 
systematic attempt to optimize choice; instead, they tend to choose an action with satisfying 
results. Optimization requires a thorough search of all logical possibilities, but due to the brain’s 
limited information processing capacity, it proves to be unsuccessful [93]. These limitations can 
make individuals prone to reasoning bias, human error, and fluctuating emotions [94]. Moreover, 
less experienced decision-makers in our game showed more flexibility in searching for 
alternatives in the second level of the game. This is consistent with prior similar findings that 
less experienced managers are more likely to engage in trying other alternatives, while 
experienced managers often tend to avoid risky actions [90]. 
Finally, consistent with prior research in other settings, e.g., [95, 96], our results show that 
the shortcomings above can be remedied through an iterative learning process using management 
flight simulators (i.e., simulation-based gaming environments). Managers can make and 
implement their decisions, advance the simulation, monitor the effects of their decisions over 
time, evaluate the performance of their decisions, reset the simulation, and redo this process with 
alternative sets of decisions. 
5.2. Implications for practice 
This research carries important implications for managing cybersecurity in organizations. First, it 
suggests that cognitive searches for optimizing resource allocation (i.e., individuals using their 
mental models and reasoning abilities to identify optimum investment decisions) for 
cybersecurity capability development are not the correct strategies, due to the complexities of 
cybersecurity capability development. We heard from several managers, through the comment 
box made available to players after finishing the game, that their thinking was heavily focused on 
searching for an optimum decision. One of the subjects said: 
“The game demonstrates that even with a relatively simplified version of reality, 
determining ‘optimum’ cybersecurity investment is very difficult (or even impossible in 
the face of random attacks) - something that many senior executives still need to 
understand.” 
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Second, this research directs managers’ attention to a major aspect of complexity in 
managing cybersecurity: feedback delays. While prior research on cybersecurity has 
predominately focused on risk estimation and uncertainty (other drivers of complexity), we 
observe that delays are often overlooked in decision-making for cybersecurity.  
Therefore, there is a great need for training tools to reinforce the weakness of a sole-focus, 
cognition-driven approach to optimum strategy development and to better understand the 
impacts of feedback delays. The cybersecurity community has recently begun making efforts to 
intervene by involving and educating top-level managers and executives. This approach is well-
supported by the research findings that: 1) Commitment by top executives is essential for 
adoption, implementation, and assimilation of security capabilities [97-99]; and 2) Cybersecurity 
concerns affect an entire organization (not just IT departments or isolated response teams) [100, 
101]; hence, the responsibility for addressing such issues should belong to managers at higher 
organizational levels.  
However, current training does not address the two training needs mentioned above. 
Cybersecurity training for top executives and decision-makers can benefit from our findings and 
include simulation game environments to challenge managers with: 1) the difficulties of 
cognitive searches for optimal decisions; and 2) the effects of feedback delays in decision-
making. The simulation environment provides a context in which can implement various 
strategies in any number of repetitions without fear of real consequences. Our simulation game 
approach, which showed that iterative learning significantly improved proactive decision-
making, can be used in developing training materials that better address the educational needs of 
managers. 
5.3. Limitations and future research directions 
The purpose of this study was not to focus on how to improve the understanding of the 
complexities of cybersecurity capability development, but rather to draw attention to the lack of 
understanding of these complexities at the managerial level. We also did not study how or in 
what priority various cybersecurity capabilities—such as prevention, detection, and response—
should be developed. Working with experienced managers from a wide range of organizations, 
our observations show that many organizations that develop cybersecurity capabilities seem to 
take prevention and detection capabilities into consideration while ignoring response capabilities. 
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A possible extension to our simulation game would be to study the consequences of such an 
approach in the long run. On the importance of response capabilities, a cybersecurity expert, and 
the former White House chief information officer noted [102]:  
“Preparing, planning, and especially testing for a cyber incident is crucial for 
all companies, both large and small. Whether your company has been actively 
managing cyber security risk for years or you are just beginning to develop an 
incident response capability, it is critical for boards and executives to engage 
employees in developing a robust, integrated approach to incident response. 
Unfortunately, companies too commonly put this task off and then find 
themselves flat-footed during a breach.”  
Another limitation of this study is that we did not measure the risk tolerance held by 
individuals. Future research could take into account individual risk tolerance as it could help 
reveal insights into managerial decision-making biases with regards to cybersecurity. Future 
studies could also enhance our model by fitting it to empirical data of historical cyber events. 
Our experiment could also benefit from larger sample sizes, or the inclusion of non-security 
business experts as another control group. A more sophisticated version of the game could be 
developed, allowing players to take on different roles and play in teams, or play against other 
players in an ‘attackers versus defenders’ scenario. Interesting complexities will likely arise in a 
game where there are several interdependent groups, such as how attractive a particular 
organization is for attackers relative to others in the simulation game. 
It would be interesting to study how players who have been given different initial settings 
perform in the simulation game. For example, a player who begins the simulation with 
compromised systems may behave differently from a player who begins the simulation with all 
systems in the ‘not-at-risk’ set, especially if they are informed about the situation. In another 
experiment, one group of players could be told to consider cybersecurity development costs as 
expenses, while another group is told that these same costs are investments. Further studies could 
also test the performance of players with various levels of targeted cybersecurity training. 
Experiments may also introduce different vectors of cyberattacks and different types of defenses 
in which players could invest. Moreover, studies could consider various time horizons for 
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simulation runs (e.g., random duration of each game instead of the fixed five-year duration in our 
experiment) to reduce possible end-game strategizing. 
Future studies could also focus on the source of biases in decision-making. Behavioral 
economics research shows that managers rely on a set of heuristics to make decisions in 
situations with uncertainty, and that these heuristics can potentially cause systematic errors. This 
phenomenon has received little attention in cybersecurity research, which is concerning, as a 
manager’s biased assessment of cyber risks could hamper an organization’s ability to respond to 
cyberattacks.  
Two major heuristics, availability and representativeness, could be considered in the 
development of simulation games in the future. Availability refers to how readily examples come 
to an individual’s mind [103]. People assess the likelihood of risks by considering past 
experiences. For example, if accidents or natural catastrophes have not occurred to them in the 
past, people are less likely to buy insurance. Similarly, if managers have not experienced—or are 
not aware of—any major cyberattacks that have affected their own organizations, they are less 
likely to take cyber risks seriously. Thus, the probability of cyber events occurring, given that 
cyber events may not be visible, is estimated to be lower than it is in actuality. The second 
heuristic is representativeness [103]. Representativeness describes how a certain event that 
shares similar characteristics with another set of events is often grouped together with the other 
events. The fact that something is more representative does not make it more likely. Thus, 
individuals relying too heavily on representativeness to make judgments are liable to make a 
decision for the wrong reasons [104]. Representativeness can result in serious misconceptions, 
especially in situations involving randomness and sequences of random events. If a person flips a 
fair coin five times and gets head every time, they may find it difficult to believe that the coin is 
indeed fair. However, if they flip the coin many times (e.g., 100 times or more), they will 
observe that the sequence is truly random [103]. Making decisions about uncertain cyber events 
is subject to this same type of error. Managers may believe that cyber events are not random and 
will likely look for patterns informed by past events to confront uncertainty. Using availability 
and representativeness heuristics together increases the chance of making the wrong decision in 
an uncertain world and future studies could study their impacts on decision-making in 
cybersecurity capability development.  
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6. Conclusions 
Using our simulation game tool, we have focused on understanding how managers make 
proactive investment decisions for building cybersecurity capabilities. In general, there are two 
properties that contribute to the difficulty of making informed, proactive decisions: 
 The trade-off between allocating resources to profitable activities versus investing in 
cybersecurity capabilities, with the perceived payoff for the latter being affected by the ‘delay’ 
between their development and reaching full functionality. 
 The uncertainty surrounding the occurrence of cyber events, as shown in the differences 
in results from the two levels of the simulation game. 
Our experiment results present that neither experienced nor inexperienced players showed 
performance differences in the game. This suggests deeply entrenched decision-making 
heuristics, reinforced over years of experience, and is supported directionally by our analysis of 
learning curves in the experienced group. Experienced players who performed well in level one 
did not perform well in level two, and vice versa, suggesting that their strategies did not adapt to 
the environment in which they found themselves. Inexperienced players, on the other hand, 
showed much more dynamism in adapting to repeated runs and the changing environment 
between levels one and two (see Figure 10). This is not to say that we do not recommend hiring 
experienced managers, but we conclude that management experience alone does not help when 
making decisions related to cybersecurity. Our results showed significantly positive learning 
effects on proactive decision-making among experienced managers. Therefore, training for better 
understanding of the complexities of cybersecurity is essential for experienced managers to 
improve their decision-making, and management flight simulators proved to be effective training 
tools. 
Overall, our findings highlight the importance of correctly training decision-makers about 
cybersecurity capability development. We hope that our findings motivate the cybersecurity 
community to design and adopt enhanced educational and training programs that challenge 
entrenched mindsets and encourage proactive cybersecurity capability development. We note 
that the main mechanisms of our game are based on general capability development dynamics 
not limited to cybersecurity. The insight from this study of the importance of proactive decision-
making can be applied in other settings as well, but it remains that the organizational aspect of 
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cybersecurity, and particularly, decision-making for the development of cybersecurity 
capabilities, has not received adequate attention.  
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